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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SUSAN H. EARLY,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Respondent/Plaintiff,
-vs-

Supreme Court No. 8903 06-CA

DAVID W. EARLY,
Appellant/Defendant.

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under the
provisions of Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2A-3(2)(h).

II.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

This is an appeal from a judgment entered in favor of
Respondent Susan H. Early ("Mrs. Early") and against Appellant
David W. Early ("Mr. Early") for certain sums which Mr. Early
was required to pay pursuant to prior orders of the court,
including real estate taxes accruing prior to the Decree of
Divorce in the amount of $3325.00, and from the court's denial
of Mr. Early's request for a judgment for certain sums allegedly
owed him by Mrs. Early.

III.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The following issues are presented for review by this
appeal:
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in

entering judgment against Mr. Early for the amount of property
taxes on the former residence of the parties which accrued prior
to the entry of the Decree of Divorce which the court had
previously ordered Mr. Early to pay?
2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in

refusing to enter judgment in favor of Mr. Early for sums he
allegedly paid for Mrs. Early's bills prior to the time he
released all claims against Mrs. Early?
3.

Did the district court in entering the Judgment

against Mr. Early violate the provisions of Rule 52(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which requires a brief written
statement setting forth the grounds of a decision with respect
to certain motions?

IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

The Proceedings Below.

A Decree of Divorce was entered in favor of Mrs. Early
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in October, 1988.

Thereafter, in February, 1988, Mrs. Early

filed a Motion for Order of Contempt and Judgment for Mr.
Early's failure to pay various sums he was required to pay under
prior orders of the court, including real property taxes on the
former residence of the parties which accrued prior to the entry
of the Decree of Divorce.

Mr. Early, in turn, filed his own

Motion for Entry of Judgment against Mrs. Early on the purported
basis that she had failed to pay certain obligations.
On April 17, 1989, the court, the Honorable Richard H.
Moffat, entered judgment in favor of Mrs. Early in the sum of
$7424.87 and denied Mr. Early's request for judgment. Mr. Early
filed his Notice of Appeal from the Order and Judgment on May
12, 1989.

B.

Statement of Facts.

1. Mrs. Early filed this divorce proceeding on November
25, 1986.

[R. 2]

2.

In March, 1987, Mrs. Early filed an Order to Show

Cause concerning temporary alimony, child support and other
interim matters. On March 30, 1987, Commissioner Sandra Peuler
issued her recommendations.

Insofar as relevant to the present

appeal,

recommended

the

Commissioner

that

Mr.

Early

responsible for payment of property taxes accruing on the
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residence of the parties pending final resolution of the case.
Specifically,

the

recommendations

provided

that

Mr.

Early

"maintain the mortgage, tax and insurance payments on the
parties1 home during the pendency of this action."
3.

On June

24, 1987, Judge Moffat

[R. 318-319]
approved

the

Commissioners recommendations, thereby ordering that Mr. Early
was responsible for property taxes accruing on the residence
prior to final resolution of the matter.
4.

[R. 398]

After several days of trial in August, 1988, the

parties were able to resolve all disputes between them with the
exception of certain payments, now here at issue, which Mrs.
Early contended Mr. Early was obligated to pay by prior order of
the court.

Accordingly, on October 13, 1988 when the parties

signed a Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement, Mrs.
Early expressly preserved the claim by providing that her
obligation to pay debts incurred by her since separation of the
parties excepted those which Mr. Early was required to pay
pursuant to previous court orders.

Specifically, paragraph 12

of the agreement provided:
The Plaintiff [Mrs. Early] agrees to assume
and pay the separate debts and obligations which
she has incurred subsequent to the separation of
the parties, excepting those which, by Order of the
Court, Defendant is obligated to pay, and agrees to
indemnify
and hold
the Defendant
harmless
therefrom. [Emphasis Added] [R. 789]
5. On October 26, 1988, the parties entered into a very
broad Mutual Release insisted upon by Mr. Early by which the
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parties released each other from any claims whatsoever except
such rights and obligations as were specifically provided in the
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement and the Decree of
Divorce to be entered,
6.

[R. 802]

Thereafter, on October 28, 1988, the court entered

a Decree of Divorce.

Paragraph 13 of that Decree required Mr.

Early to pay obligations for which he was responsible pursuant
to previous orders of the court.

Specifically, the Decree

provided:
The Plaintiff [Mrs. Early] shall assume and
pay the separate debts and obligations which she
has incurred subsequent to the separation of the
parties, excepting those which, by previous Order
of the Court, Defendant is obligated to pay, and
shall indemnify and hold the Defendant harmless
therefrom. [Emphasis Added] [R. 77 6]
7. Mr. Early failed to pay various amounts which he was
required to pay pursuant to the Decree of Divorce and the
previous order of the court, including the sum of $3 3 2 5.00
representing the prorated amount of property taxes accrued on
the residence through the date the Decree of Divorce was
entered.

Accordingly, in February, 1989, Mrs. Early filed a

Motion for Order of Contempt and Judgment requesting that the
court enter judgment for these amounts.
8.

[R. 875]

Mr. Early then filed his own motion asking that

judgment be entered in his favor for a net amount of $11,344.84
on the purported basis that prior to the entry of the divorce
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decree he had paid various bills owed by Mrs. Early which she
allegedly incurred after the separation of the parties.

[R. 905

and 909]
9.

After taking the matter under advisement, the

district court issued a minute entry dated March 28, 1989
finding that a judgment should be entered in favor of Mrs. Early
in the sum of $7424.87 and denying Mr. Early's request for
judgment.

The minute entry specifically provided:

The Court finds that the Defendant [Mr. Early]
has failed to make payments and perform pursuant to
the terms of the Stipulation and the Judgment based
thereon. The Court therefore finds that a judgment
in the sum of $7424.87 should be entered against
Defendant in favor of Plaintiff. The basis of this
is, inter alia, as set forth in the supporting
Memorandum of the Plaintiff. The Court further
finds that the Reply Memorandum and claim for
offset by the Defendant, together with his request
for attorney's fees should be denied, there being
no basis therefor... [R. 919]
10.

On April 17, 1989, the court entered its Order and

Judgment in favor of Mrs. Early in the sum of $7424.87.

[R.

925]

V.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1.

The Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement

entered into between the parties and the Decree of Divorce
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entered by the court both specifically provided that Mr. Early
remained

responsible

for any debts and obligations he was

required to pay pursuant to previous orders of the court.

The

court's previous order obligated Mr. Early to pay all property
taxes accruing during the pendency of the action. The fact that
the real property taxes for the year 1988 were not actually
delinquent until November 30, 1988, after the divorce decree was
entered is irrelevant.

Those taxes were accruing each month

during the pendency of the action.
absolutely

In any event, Mr. Early has

failed to show any abuse of discretion

in the

district court's interpretation of its own order as requiring
Mr. Early to pay the taxes.
2.

Mr. Early was not entitled to recover any amounts

which he allegedly paid prior to the entry of the divorce decree
on Mrs. Early's bills because he released any such claims by
virtue of the Mutual Release which he signed on October 26,
1988.
3. The district court was not required to issue a brief
written statement of the ground for its decision under Rule
52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as Mrs. Early's
motion was not one under Rules 12(b), 50(a) or (b), 56 or 59.
In any event, the district court did in fact issue a brief
written statement of the ground for its decision.
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VI.
ARGUMENT

A.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in

Entering Judgment in Favor of Mrs. Early.

Paragraph 13 of the Decree of Divorce specifically
recognized

Mr. Early's

continuing

previously ordered by the court.

obligation

to pay debts

In response to Mrs. Early's

motion for entry of judgment, the court determined that Mr.
Early was obligated by the prior court order to pay the taxes on
the residence. Mr. Early essentially argues on this appeal that
the

district

requiring

court

misinterpreted

Mr. Early

to be

its

responsible

own

previous

order

for property

taxes

accruing on the parties' home during the pendency of the action.
Mr. Early erroneously argues that because under the provisions
of Utah Code Ann. , Section 59-2-1325, the taxes were not
delinguent until November 30, 1988, that he had no obligation to
pay that portion of the 1988 property taxes which accrued prior
to October 28, 1988, the date the Decree of Divorce was entered.
The district court properly rejected this mischaracterization of
its prior order.
Taxes were accruing on the residence each day that this
lawsuit was pending,
delinquent.

regardless

of when the taxes

became

In fact, the taxes were a lien upon the residence

as of January 1, 1988. Utah Code Ann. , Section 59-2-1303.
8

The

situation is no different in principle than when an owner sells
his home during the year prior to the time taxes are delinquent.
The seller is responsible for payment of those taxes which
attached as a lien to the property prior to the sale date.
Similarly, if Mrs, Early incurred a credit card charge one week
before the separation of the parties which wasn't billed by the
credit card company until a month later and wasn't delinquent
until two months later, Mr. Early would hardly be heard to argue
that Mrs. Early is responsible for the bill as one she incurred
after separation.

The determinative factor is not when an item

of expense is delinquent, but when it was incurred.

In any

event, even if there were some ambiguity in the court's prior
order in this regard, the district court was in the best
position to rule on the meaning of its prior order.

Mr. Early

has presented absolutely no evidence or basis for a finding that
the district court abused its discretion in this regard.

See,

e.g., Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974).

B.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in

Refusing to Enter Judgment in Favor of Mr. Early.

As previously stated, Mr. Early sought judgment against
Mrs. Early on the basis that prior to the Decree of Divorce
being entered he had paid various bills which she incurred after
separation of the parties.

However, the Mutual Release which

Mr. Early signed on October 26, 1988, after he supposedly paid
9

these sums, specifically released any such claims. That Release
provided in part:
[T]he said parties and each of them, do hereby
release and forever discharge the other of, from,
and against any and all claims, demands, causes of
action, obligations, damages, and liabilities of
any nature whatsoever, whether known or unknown,
suspected or claimed, which they, and each of them,
ever had, now have, or may hereafter have or claim
to have against the other, whether known or
unknown,
including,
specifically,
but
not
exclusively, and without limiting the generality of
the foregoing, any and all claims and causes of
action, based on, or in any manner arising out of
the marriage relationship of the parties, or any
other relationship, existing prior thereto, or in
any manner connected therewith. [R. 802]
Because Mr. Early paid the expenses he seeks to charge to Mrs.
Early before he signed the Release, his claim is clearly barred
by the Release.
Mr. Early asserts in his brief that Mrs. Early is
claiming "The best of both worlds —

no obligations on her part

to Mr. Early, but he owing her everything."

[Appellant's Brief,

p. 15] Mrs. Early is claiming nothing of the sort. Mrs. Early
simply claims that Mr. Early is bound by the agreements signed
by the parties, the Decree of Divorce entered by the district
court, and the court's prior order.

Mr. Early's claim for

reimbursement of bills paid prior to the Release is clearly
barred by its express language.

On the other hand, the Release

specifically preserved Mrs. Early's rights under the Property
Settlement Agreement and Decree of Divorce, which in turn both
specifically required Mr. Early to pay all debts he had been
previously ordered to pay.

Mr. Early never bargained for or
10

received any such reservation of rights.

If, at the time the

Release was signed, Mr. Early had a claim that he had paid debts
incurred by Mrs. Early since separation of the parties, that
matter should have been raised by Mr. Early as part of the
negotiations, rather than months later in a belated attempt to
evade his obligations under the Decree of Divorce and previous
court order.

C.

The Court's Judgment Did Not Violate Rule 52(a).

Finally, Mr. Early asserts that the court violated the
provisions of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by
supposedly failing to issue a brief written statement of the
basis for its ruling.

This contention is frivolous.

In the first place, the court was not required to issue
a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on a
motion for entry of judgment for failure to pay amounts required
by previous orders of the court.

Rule 52(a) only requires a

written statement where motions are granted under Rules 12(b),
50(a) and (b) , 56 and 59.
under any of those rules.

Mrs. Early's motion was not made
Further, Rule 52(a) only requires a

written statement when the motion is based on more than one
ground.

In the case at bar, Mrs. Early's motion with respect to

the taxes which Mr. Early challenges was only made on one ground
—

that is that Mr. Early had failed to pay the taxes he was

required to pay by previous court order.
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Second, in its March 28, 1989 Minute Entry granting Mrs.
Early judgment, the district court did in fact state the basis
of its ruling.

The court specifically stated that:

The court finds that the Defendant has failed
to make payments and perform pursuant to the terms
of the Stipulation and the Judgment based
thereon. * . The basis of this is, inter alia, as set
forth in the supporting Memorandum of the
Plaintiff.

CONCLUSION

The district court correctly held that Mr. Early was
obligated to pay the taxes on the parties1 former residence and
that Mr. Early had released any claim relating to bills which he
paid prior to the execution of the Mutual Release.

Mr. Early

has not even approached meeting his burden of demonstrating an
abuse of discretion by the district court in its interpretation
of the parties1

agreements

and

the court's prior orders.

Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the district
court's judgment should be affirmed.
DATED this f)

day of November, 1989.

Attorneys for Respondent
js early\brief
12

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed four
(4) copies of the within Brief of Respondent to the following
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